The personal qualities that have been called epistemic virtues are a motley crew, including character traits like open-mindedness and curiosity, cognitive faculties like intelligence and memory, and intellectual abilities, such as the ability to solve complex mathematical problems. We value such qualities, in ourselves and others. But why? Is it because of the role they play in securing some epistemic good for their possessor, such as knowledge, wisdom, or understanding? Or—since we seem to value such qualities even when they do (...) not actually secure some epistemic good for their possessor—is it merely in virtue of the fact that they tend to secure such goods, or even merely that they aim at such goods? Is it because such qualities are instrumental to, or perhaps even partly constitutive of, living a happy or flourishing life? Or are they perhaps valuable for their own sakes, either simply in virtue of what they are, or because they are part of being a good, or excellent, or admirable person? -/- In this chapter, I will lay the groundwork for a philosophically rigorous discussion of this question. I will begin by giving an overview of some of the standard philosophical usages of ‘epistemic virtue’, and drawing some distinctions in value that provide the necessary conceptual vocabulary for adequate reflection on the question. Only after we have a sense of what is variously meant by ‘epistemic virtue’, and the ways in which such personal qualities may potentially be valuable, will we be in a position to directly address the question “what makes the epistemic virtues valuable?”. In the final section of this chapter, I will review a few of the most interesting and plausible answers to this question, but my main aim here is to provide the resources the reader needs in order to effectively consider, for him- or herself, the question “what—if anything— makes the epistemic virtues valuable?”. (shrink)

Ask a non-philosopher whether it’s rational to be moral, and she will likely think the answer is relatively clear: intuitively, what is moral is often at odds with what is rational. For example, although giving a dollar to a needy stranger would be a moral thing to do, the rational thing to do would be to keep it for yourself. Among professional philosophers, by contrast, the answer is not so obvious. Philosophers have subtle views of rationality and morality. Seldom, if (...) ever, do they understand norms of rationality as straightforwardly implying that we single-mindedly pursue our own self-interest, narrowly construed, and seldom, if ever, do they understand norms of morality as straightforwardly implying that we should always help others, regardless of our circumstances. -/- Among philosophers, then, the proposal that it is rationally permissible, or even required, to be moral, is not dismissed out of hand in light of apparent counterexamples. I propose that philosophers should take the same open-minded attitude to the proposal that virtue is compatible with, or even necessary for, well-being. Philosophers have sometimes denied that virtue is necessary for well-being on much the same grounds that our envisioned person on the street dismissed the possibility that morality may be rationally required: by pointing out apparent counterexamples (Haybron 2007: 5–11; see Chapter 15 by Besser-Jones, this volume). But, just like the question “is it rational to be moral?” the question “is virtue compatible with, or even required for, well-being?” cannot be dismissed so easily, because apparent counterexamples depend on only intuitive, commonsense, pre-theoretical understandings of virtue and well-being. -/- Any claim about the relationship between virtue and well-being must take the form of a con- ditional—for example: if this account of virtue and this account of well-being are correct, then virtue is necessary for (or compatible with, or the best bet for achieving, etc.) well-being.2 This point sets the structure for this chapter. In this chapter, I will (1) sketch an account of virtue, (2) develop a specific sense in which one might argue that virtue is necessary for well-being, and (3) explore the prospects for the proposal that virtue is necessary for well-being, discussing some of the main accounts of well-being in turn. I will argue that on some (though not all) accounts of well-being, there is reason to think that, when we more fully develop an account of the (fundamental, direct, intrinsic) contributors to well-being, we may discover that virtue is indeed necessary for well-being. (shrink)

Tom Regan holds that all subjects-of-a-life possess equal inherent value, and thus have an equal right to be treated with respect. In this chapter, I consider an apparent implication of Regan's principle: that we have an obligation to rescue prey from their predators. This apparent implication is counterintuitive to many people who otherwise accept Regan's principle, so it is worth considering whether it is indeed implied by Regan's principle. Regan argues that his principle does not imply we have an obligation (...) to rescue prey from their predators; I consider this argument, and show that it does not succeed. Instead, I offer a different argument, inspired by a eudaimonist approach, but compatible with Regan's rights-centered framework. (shrink)

In the contemporary virtue ethics literature, eudaimonia is discussed far more often than it is defined or fully articulated. It was introduced into the contemporary virtue ethics literature by philosophers who work in ancient philosophy, and who are familiar with the work of ancient eudaimonists (where the ancient eudaimonists are typically thought to include Plato, the Stoics, and (especially) Aristotle). Yet, predictably, among philosophers who study ancient philosophy, there is not consensus, but rather lively debate, about what eudaimonia is: how (...) the various ancient eudaimonists understood it, the role it played in their theories, and so on.2 In this chapter, I will discuss the role of eudaimonia in contemporary virtue ethics, and especially contemporary eudaimonist virtue ethics. (shrink)

Recently a number of philosophers have argued for a kind of encroachment of the practical into the epistemic. Fantl and McGrath, for example, argue that if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. (Fantl and McGrath 2007) In this paper I make a preliminary case for what we might call encroachment in, not knowledge or justification, but epistemic excellence, recent accounts of which include those of Roberts and Wood (2007), Bishop and Trout (2005), (...) and Baehr (2011). I believe that practical considerations bear on whether a disposition is an epistemic excellence, and I propose a practical condition on epistemic excellence that is roughly analogous to the practical condition on knowledge proposed by Fantl and McGrath. Since the view is also an epistemic analogue to a kind of moral rationalism in ethics, we might also call it a variety of ‘epistemic rationalism’. (shrink)

Many philosophers find the prospect of working with researchers in the social and behavioral sciences exciting, in part because they hope that these researchers might be able to measure well-being as the philosopher conceives of it. In this chapter, I consider how the measurement of well- being, as it is conceived of by philosophers, might feasibly be facilitated. I propose that existing scales can be employed to measure well-being as philosophers conceive of it. I support this conclusion through an in-depth (...) discussion of an example. I explain how the scale of psychological well- being developed by Carol Ryff and validated in more than 750 empirical studies (Ryff, 2016, 2018) may be employed to measure the extent to which a person has realized an ostensible basic good. This discussion will be illustrative of the general method that may be employed to bring empirical researchers and philosophers into contact in a way that will facilitate the measurement of well-being as philosophers conceive of it. (shrink)

This edition of the early diaries of Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), which are housed in the Carnap estate at the University of Pittsburgh, was published in two volumes by Felix Meiner Verlag Hamburg in 2021 and 2022. These are also the first two volumes of the Meiner Edition Schriften aus dem Nachlass von Rudolf Carnap. The title of these two volumes is succinctly Rudolf Carnap. Tagebücher (Rudolf Carnap. Diaries), supplemented by the respective indication of the volume. Volume 1 (approx. 600 pages) (...) comprises the diaries from 1908 to 1919, Volume 2 (approx. 900 pages) those from 1920 to 1935. With these volumes, the diaries of one of the central thinkers of the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism become accessible to a wider circle of researchers and interested parties. While the diaries were previously only partially accessible, they have now for the first time been released in their entirety in the form of a proper text-critical edition. The editor is Christian Damböck with the collaboration of Brigitte Arden, Roman Jordan, Brigitte Parakenings and Lois M. Rendl. Text transcriptions of the originals, which Carnap had written in shorthand, served as the basis for the edition. The transcription was done by Brigitte Parakenings and Brigitte Arden, further editing by Lois M. Rendl and Roman Jordan. (shrink)

Book review for 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology, edited by Gail Weiss, Anne V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon (2020).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Art of Teaching MusicBetty Anne YounkerEstelle R. Jorgensen, The Art of Teaching Music(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008)I have had the pleasure of reading the book manuscript, The Art of Teaching Music, by Estelle Jorgensen. The content explores a variety of ideas that are covered in the myriad of courses experienced by undergraduate students and introduces new ones that are critical to the development of musicians (...) and prospective teachers. Some of these ideas might be alluded to or briefly discussed in methods classes, but not at the level of thoughtful detail as they are entertained and examined in the book. This level of depth would require students and teachers to discuss, dialogue, debate, and reflect over time within and across semesters and courses. I dare to suggest that some of the ideas might not be brought to students’ attention at all throughout the undergraduate experience, which is of a concern and suggests an even greater need for such a book.My overall impression of the book is that the content and the depth of writing would serve the undergraduate students throughout their undergraduate experience and the graduate population for similar and yet different reasons. In terms of the undergraduates, there are parts of the book that would be relevant during their first year in a foundations class, second year in technique classes, third year in methods (for lack of a better word) classes, and student teaching [End Page 109] seminar experiences as they prepare to enter the profession. Utilizing a book across an undergraduate’s experience could generate interesting conversation amongst faculty members as discussions about why, how, what, and when parts of the book would be relevant would need to evolve. Some chapters could be revisited while others visited for the first time at differing places and spaces across the four years. I cannot think of another book that could be utilized in this way and thus serve the undergraduate student throughout her four-year experience and this prospect I find exciting.The book is organized around fourteen chapters, all of which are followed by an afterward. The flow of the chapters invites the reader to examine aspects of becoming and being a music educator at various levels of growth and understanding.The first chapter is titled “Teacher” and requires the reader to think at broader and deeper levels when discussing the notions of role and identity, self-awareness, motivation to enter the profession, and reflective practice. While reading the text, I imagined conversations that would include a comparative analysis of students’ experiences, which could in turn provide larger contexts for the topics. Such a discussion is necessary when examining aspects of being and becoming a teacher in various contexts. The notion of situatedness is highlighted when individual cases are heard and examined and compared across other cases, carefully noting what might or might not be comparable and taking that bit of analysis into consideration. Having such discussions across the four years of undergraduate life allows students to re-visit what was and is, and to speculate about what is to come. Such reflection can be just as fruitful at the graduate level. Students enter graduate school with a variety of teaching experiences and time is needed to reflect on the transition from being a teacher to being a student again. Realization of the continuum on which they travel between learner and teacher becomes apparent in that the place on the continuum shifts regardless of their present position; that is, as a student or teacher. For doctoral students, this reflection is rich as they begin to engage with undergraduate students and forge a new path as budding teachers of teachers and researchers and continue to be musicians.Chapter Two took me to the writings of Dewey1 particularly as I read about a student-centered focus and the experience-based approach. So much of our profession has been driven by content and theories that the student has been removed from the center of the focus and thought of as peripheral. I welcome the idea of placing the students at the center of our thinking and conversations. These ideas have been articulated in... (shrink)

Ann Hartle - Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.3 500-501 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Ann Hartle Emory University David Gauthier. Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiv + 196. Paper, $22.99. The unity of Rousseau's thought is among the most serious challenges faced by his interpreters. How are we to reconcile the submission of the individual to (...) the general will in the Social Contract with the solitary and free individual of the state of nature in the Discourse on Inequality and the autobiographical works? One of the great merits of this book is that it does offer, as the author promises, a.. (shrink)

The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be discussed constructivelywithout impeding evolutionary psychologicalresearch. A key is to show how ethicalbehaviors, in addition to unethical behaviors,can evolve by natural (...) selection. (shrink)

Some authors in disability studies have identified limits of both the medical and social models of disability. They have developed an alternative model, which I call the ‘composite model of disability’, to theorise societies’ ableist norms and structures along with the subjective/phenomenological experience of disability. This model maintains that ableist oppression is not the only source of suffering for disabled people: impairment can be as well. From a feminist, queer, trans activist, anti-ableist perspective and using an intersectional, autoethnographic methodology, I (...) apply this composite model of disability to trans identities to consider the potentially ‘debilitating’ aspects of transness. I argue that transness, like disability, has too often been perceived from two perspectives, medical or social, without the benefit of a third option. From a medical perspective, transness is reduced to an individual pathology curable with hormonal/surgical treatments, a conceptualisation that erases structural oppression. From a social point of view, transness is conceptualised as a neutral condition and variation in sex/gender identity. In this model, structural oppression (transphobia/cisgenderism) is seen as the only cause of ‘trans suffering’. I argue that, just as the medical and social models of disability provide limited opportunities for reflection on the complex experience of disability, medical and social understandings of transness, respectively, are insufficient to describe the complexity of trans experience. I explore the possibilities presented by the application of a composite model of disability in trans studies. By both problematising cisgenderist oppression and acknowledging trans people's subjective experiences of suffering through some of the debilitating aspects of transness, this composite model avoids the pitfalls of the medical and social models. The application of tools from disability studies to trans issues uncovers cisnormativity in disability movements and denounces ableism in trans movements. This will, I hope, solidify alliances between these communities and fields of study. (shrink)

This long-awaited two-volume set constitutes the definitive presentation of the system of classifying moral judgment built up by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates over a period of twenty years. Researchers in child development and education around the world, many of whom have worked with interim versions of the system, indeed, all those seriously interested in understanding the problem of moral judgment, will find it an indispensable resource. Volume I reviews Kohlberg's stage theory, and the by-now large body of research on (...) the significance and utility of his moral stages. Issues of reliability and validity are addressed. The volume ends with detailed instructions for using the forms in Volume 2. Volume 2, in a specially-designed, user-friendly format, includes three alternative functionally-equivalent forms of the scoring system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Classical Islamic Philosophy: A Thematic Introduction by Luis Xavier López-FarjeatThérèse-Anne DruartLuis Xavier López-Farjeat. Classical Islamic Philosophy: A Thematic Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2022. Pp. 368. Paperback, $34.36.Interest in classical Islamic philosophy has grown and recently given rise to several presentations of the field: The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, edited by Richard C. Taylor and Luis Xavier López-Farjeat (New York: Routledge, 2016); Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter. Ein (...) Handbuch, edited by Heidrun Eichner, Matthias Perkams, and Christian Schäfer (Darmstadt: WBG, 2017); and The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, edited by Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). One may, therefore, wonder whether López-Farjeat should have provided another one. My answer is a resounding "yes." The Oxford Handbook presents specific texts, The Routledge [End Page 320] Companion gives brief overviews of specific themes, and Islamische Philosophie provides a sketch of the development of Arabic-Islamic philosophy as well as an introduction to some of the major philosophers' most significant themes or works. By contrast, López-Farjeat offers a detailed picture of lively philosophical debates between philosophers, theologians, and other intellectuals, showing how philosophy pervaded thinking in the Islamic lands and was itself enriched by serious thinking in theology and other fields.After presenting the Islamic context and the translation movement from Greek into Arabic, López-Farjeat focuses on six main themes: (1) Theologians and Philosophers on Islamic Revelation; (2) The Classification of the Sciences, Logic, and Language; (3) Philosophy and the Natural Science; (4) Metaphysics in the Islamic Philosophical Context; (5) Psychology and Theories of Cognition; and (6) Ethics and Political Philosophy. In each case, he focuses on various much-debated philosophical issues, reconstructing their evolution. He begins by highlighting the Greek background, then moves to show chronologically how and why those debates evolved. When needed, he indicates in which other section of the book the context for a particular philosopher's or theologian's specific position on a debated issue can be found. Finally, after each chapter, he gives an excellent list of further readings (mostly in English) for the reader who wishes to delve more deeply into the topic.López-Farjeat's approach highlights the liveliness and the nuances of the debates between intellectuals of various religious persuasions in a way rarely done before. Such a detailed attention to specific contexts also means that his book does not allow for a quick, easy read. It provides all the information that even someone unfamiliar with Islamic studies or ancient philosophy may need to appreciate the richness and depth of Islamic-Arabic thinking, but this amount of information requires close and slow reading. López-Farjeat's frequent references to scholarly disagreement about specific issues could make this book at times challenging for nonspecialists. This means, however, that even seasoned scholars might find something to learn from López-Farjeat's treatments of the aspects of Islamic thought they might be less familiar with. And while beginners will need some time to absorb the vast amount of information López-Farjeat provides, they will be grateful for the clear way he has organized it.Too often and for too long have historians of Islamic philosophy focused on thinkers who saw themselves as mainly Aristotelians and neglected what philosophers learned from other disciplines, in particular from theology, be it Islamic or Christian. This book shows how Christians in the Islamic world had already integrated some Greek philosophy into their thinking from an early time, when they first entered into dialogue with Islamic theologians. In turn, Islamic theologians integrated philosophical elements in their works. López-Farjeat's knowledge of Islamic theology and Eastern Christian theology allows him to show that this process of integration was not a one-way street. The Islamic milieu and its theological developments raised new questions and issues that philosophers under Greek influences had to take into account. One does not philosophize in a vacuum: new questions raised in a different cultural and linguistic environment led to a refinement and enrichment in the understanding of philosophical issues.As an example, let us consider chapter... (shrink)

Moral Psychology spans both philosophy and psychology: it addresses questions concerning the role of emotions in moral judgment, the nature of moral motivation, whether human beings are ultimately...

Because of the transfer of responsibility from hospitals to community-based settings, providers in home-based care have more responsibilities and a wider range of tasks and responsibilities than before, often with limited resources. The increased responsibilities and the complexity of tasks and patient groups may lead to several ethical challenges. A systematic search in the databases MEDLINE, CINAHL, and SveMed+ was carried out in February 2019 and August 2020. The research question was translated into a modified PICO worksheet. A total of (...) 40 articles were included. The review is conducted according to the Vancouver Protocol. The main findings from the systematic literature review show that ethical challenges experienced by healthcare and social care providers in home-based care are related to autonomy and balancing ethical principles, decisions regarding intensity of care, challenges related to priority settings, truth-telling, and balancing the professional role. Findings regarding ethical challenges within home-based care are in line with findings from institutional healthcare and social care settings. However, some significant differences from the institutional context are also highlighted. (shrink)

Recently, training programs in research ethics have been established to enhance individual and institutional capacity in research ethics in the developing world. However, commentators have expressed concern that the efforts of these training programs have placed ‘too great an emphasis on guidelines and research ethics review’, which will have limited effect on ensuring ethical conduct in research. What is needed instead is a culture of ethical conduct supported by national and institutional commitment to ethical practices that are reinforced by (...) upstream enabling conditions, which are in turn influenced by developmental conditions. Examining this more inclusive understanding of the determinants of ethical conduct enhances at once both an appreciation of the limitations of current efforts of training programs in research ethics and an understanding of what additional training elements are needed to enable trainees to facilitate national and institutional policy changes that enhance research practices. We apply this developmental model to a training program focused in Egypt to describe examples of such additional training activities. (shrink)

Kantian Ethics aims to develop a defensible theory of ethics on the basis of Kantian principles. Its primary focus is Kantian ethics, not Kant scholarship or interpretation. The book fulfills a promise of Wood’s earlier book, Kant’s Ethical Thought , by developing a Kantian conception of virtue and theory of moral duties in greater detail, and it goes beyond Wood’s previous work on Kant’s ethics in offering extended treatments of substantive moral issues, such as social justice, sexual morality, punishment, lying, (...) consequentialism, personhood, and the status of non-rational animals.Acknowledging that his reading of Kant is now even further from traditional interpretations than it previously was, Wood contends that it is nevertheless “closer to the truth” . He aims to correct what he takes to be some serious misinterpretations of Kant’s views and, in setting the record straight, to provide for us “a better understanding of Kant’s own thoughts” . Some familiar points that Wood rejects are the ideas that Kant’s moral psychology involves a sharp dualism between nature and freedom, and that he was unconcerned with the empirical nature of human beings and human history, regarding such issues as entirely irrelevant to morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Business for the Common Good: A Christian Vision for the Marketplace by Kenman L. Wong and Scott B. Rae, and: Market Complicity and Christian Ethics by Albino BarreraAnn GibsonBusiness for the Common Good: A Christian Vision for the Marketplace Kenman L. Wong and Scott B. Rae Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2011. 285 pp. $24.00Market Complicity and Christian Ethics Albino Barrera New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 312 (...) pp. $91.00At first glance, Business for the Common Good and Market Complicity and Christian Ethics appear to be similar. Their respective authors seek to address the relationship of business and ethics—two words many readers have a difficult time putting into the same sentence, let alone into the same philosophical discussion. Both books are part of a publisher’s series: the first is part of InterVarsity’s Christian Worldview Integration series and the second is part of Cambridge University Press’s New Studies in Christian Ethics series. Nonetheless, their purposes and approaches to the subject of business ethics are quite different. Kenman Wong and Scott Rae address whether it is possible for a person to be in business for any purpose other than earning profits (28); Albino Barrera addresses whether we are morally responsible for the unintended consequences of our market transactions and, if so, to what extent would or could this be true (3).Wong and Rae lay the foundation for their argument that working in business is a calling and service to God by discussing the role of work in God’s original plan for humankind. They then contend that the biblically inspired qualities [End Page 208] of service, trust, and perseverance can be developed and nurtured in one’s business practices (114). Recognizing that business also reflects the consequences of sin—with its focus on wealth, success, and ambition (115)—they recommend that business persons cultivate spiritual disciplines such as remembering the Sabbath, considering the use of time from God’s perspective, and learning to see one’s work as a gift from God rather than as wearisome toil. They remind the reader of the following: God is the ultimate owner of all our material possessions (123); we are wise when we hold our wealth and possessions loosely (124); and the Bible measures success by the excellence with which we work (as a human reflection of God’s excellence) and by our faithfulness in pursuing this goal of excellence (133, 134).Although Wong and Rae sought to write a philosophy or theology of business (37), the book they wrote is practical; it does not have much theory and its theological assumptions are not fully explicated. Rather, it provides helpful suggestions for addressing problematic tensions in business—such as management and power, marketing and manipulation, and globalization and economic inequity. The authors remind the reader that God calls for justice and commands us to love our neighbor. In this light, they call business persons to reen-vision their work as an opportunity for serving God and neighbor. In their discussion of ethics in business they unequivocally state that “God requires integrity in the workplace not because it’s profitable but because it’s right and honors him” (188). Although they use footnotes, Wong and Rae write in a conversational style and sometimes use personal examples and stories to illustrate their points. The book contains only a scripture index, and it does not include a bibliography.In contrast, Barrera writes in a tight, logical, highly readable style; he uses extensive footnotes and provides an excellent bibliography. Drawing on concepts from tort law, economics, social philosophy, and theology, he argues for the necessity of considering the unintended consequences of our market activities. Such consideration is required because “we are the generation that ushered in the post-industrial era” with its economic reality of globalization, which both “creates new and more demanding economic obligations even as it greatly expands the occasion for our complicity in or indifference to one another’s economic misconduct” (3).Barrera’s study opens with a theory section that discusses problems in business ethics—accumulative harms, overdetermination, and interdependence—even as it seeks to answer three questions: who is complicit, why... (shrink)